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Small Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurial Activity 
of Population in Russia in the Context of the 
Economic Transformation 
Alexander Chepurenko ∗ 
Abstract: »Kleinunternehmen und Gründungsaktivitäten in Russland im Zuge 
des Transformationsprozesses«. The paper deals with the main stages of pri-
vate (small) entrepreneurship (SME) development and changing approaches to 
the SME policy in Russia under the systemic transition. The author argues that 
the entrepreneurship and SME policy in Russia remains rather reactive than 
pro-active. A special attention is paid to the crisis (2008-2009) impact both on 
the entrepreneurial activity of population based on Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitors (GEM) data as well as on the State inconsistent policy to promote 
SME under slowdown. 
In Russia, the strategic objective of government policies must be to support 
productive entrepreneurship and limit the options for rent-oriented or even 
parasitic growth of the two other types. But this task involves fundamental 
changes in the system of ownership rights and the entire structure of social re-
lations, for the domination of unproductive and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurship 
is inseparable from the system of ‘power-ownership’ dominating in Russia.  
Keywords: Russia, small entrepreneurship, early entrepreneurial activity, SME 
and entrepreneurship policy, crisis’ impact. 
1. Introduction 
Reviewing the development of the Russian private sector under the systemic 
transition in foreign academic literature, there are usually the ‘big business’ and 
so called oligarrkhs which attract most attention. Meanwhile, after 20 years of 
systemic transition a variety of bottom-up entrepreneurial forms and practics 
emerged in Russia as in other transitional societies, represented by different 
groups of firms – by size, resources used and business strategies. 
First, all of them are earning incomes from very different sources – accord-
ing to the definition of William Baumol (1990), there are different groups of 
entrepreneurial types: productive, unproductive and even destructive entrepre-
neurship existing in Russia. Productive entrepreneurship is driven by the ‘inno-
vation rent’, unproductive entrepreneurship benefits from several forms of 
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‘political rent’ (= redistributing incomes: monopolies of different kind etc.), 
and destructive entrepreneurship is earning shadow and criminal incomes (= 
redistributing property: criminal business, ‘black’ raiders etc.). These types are 
‘dissiminated’ in a very different proportion between big, medium sized, small 
and micro firms. 
Russian big business (150 to 200 biggest companies and banks) is mostly 
well embedded in political hierarchies, affiliated with State agencies and bene-
fiting to a big extent purely from political rent. In spite of a great difference 
between their position in the 1990s, when the ‘state capture’ dominated, and 
now, when ‘business capture’ by representatives of State elites is a more com-
mon way of linkage between State and big business, big Rusian holdings and 
companies are still more redistributing than generating new added value. Close 
affiliation with the State enables some of them to use a strategy of privatizing 
profits when externalizing costs. 
Among medium sized enterprises (ca. 13.000) there are different typical 
models of economic development and growth present; however, in this seg-
ment of Russian entrpreneurship one migt find a significant share of so-called 
‘gazelles’, with an annual turnover between 10-350 Mio. USD, showing more 
than 20% annual growth for longer than 4-5 years (Yudanov, 2008). These 
firms seem to have more in common with the Schumpeterian ‘innovative en-
trepreneurship’. Finally, there are small and micro entrepreneurship (ca. 1 300 
000 firms and more than 2 500 000 individuals) – although they usually tend to 
opportunistic behavior, it is a segment of entrepreneurship on the grass-roots 
level. Between these groups (and among them) one might find clearly diffferent 
types of entrepreneurial behavior – as relates to their efficiency, rate of eternal 
finincing and, hence, mode of growth (organic or M&A). So, in sum, there 
exists a great variety of entrepreneurial types in Russia now. 
The special subject of the present article will be small business and the so-
called early entrepreneurship, being the manifestation of the early entrepreneu-
rial activity (EEA) of population and the most important source of growth 
among the small businesses. This term used by the ‘Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor’ covers any groups of potential and nascent entrepreneurs as well as 
baby business owners. The EEA, expressed in the TEA-index (Reynolds et al., 
2005), is a clear and efficient measurement tool of several important features of 
entrepreneurship and its environment – the actual ability to start-up, resulting 
from the state of the human capital of nation and the state of framework condi-
tions for entrepreneurship. In other words, it indicates how entrepreneurial and 
why a nation is, being subject of special observation and monitoring.  
This article gives an overview of main trends and developments of entrepre-
neurial activity and small businesses in Russia since the beginning of the sys-
temic transformation process that started about two decades ago. 
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2. Some milestones of SME development in the 1990s 
As the main aspects of entrepreneurship and SME development in Russia in the 
1990s have been discussed in a number of papers in international journals and 
monographs (e.g., Centre for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition, 
1998; Murrell, 2005; Welter, and Smallbone, 2003), we will outline only the 
main stages that Russia has passed through in this relatively short period of 
time, undergoing a great number of changes such as prevalent forms, practices 
and types of entrepreneurship: 
1) Emergence: appearance of alternative economic agents (late 1980s)  
- formation of co-operatives and other forerunners of “opportunity based 
entrepreneurship”, 
- primitive accumulation: creeping privatisation of the state owned sector, 
- transformation of socialist “economy of shortage” into a mixed economy 
(state owned sector with fixed prices and market sector with free prices). 
2) Legalisation of the private sector in an environment of structural crisis and 
economic recession (1992-1995) 
- legalisation of private entrepreneurship, 
- booming of universal exchanges as a reaction to destruction of business 
ties, 
- formation of unproductive and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurship in the cour-
se, and as a result, of privatisation (domination in privatised enterprises 
of systems of corporate governance with high entry barriers for external 
investors and controlled by opportunistically-minded management, asset 
stripping as the principal source of unearned income) (Black, Kraakman, 
and Tarasova, 2000; Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; Moers, 2000), 
- barter trade and establishment of a ‘payment-refusal’ based economy as 
the reaction of adaptation to new conditions by privatised firms (Yakov-
lev, 2001), 
- huge market niches with low entry barriers – an incentive for ‘opportu-
nity entrepreneurship’, first of all, for micro and small business, 
- growing unemployment in traditional sectors and the widespread of the 
‘street entrepreneurship’ (Earle and Sakova, 2000), 
- limited options for external financing from legal sources, consolidation of 
economic power and political clout of major private financial institutions,  
- weak legal environment of entrepreneurship (both legislation and en-
forcement), 
- extortion racket and corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
3) Dysfunctional development of entrepreneurship in a stagnating economic 
environment (1996-1998) 
- slightly diminishing of the barter as a result of rising monetisation of the 
economy, stronger turnover of money, parallel currencies (rouble and 
dollar) in the private sector support different types of transactions, 
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- less intensive stripping of assets from privatised businesses, establish-
ment of specific models of corporate control in most post-privatised ‘pri-
vate’ firms being purely institutional traps (Frye, 2004; Iwasaki, 2003), 
- growing competition in retailing, forcing small business out of the more 
profitable niches in the consumer market by retail chains, 
- large-scale tax evasion by entrepreneurs (Yakovlev, 2001),  
- representatives of widespread types of necessity entrepreneurs (individ-
ual ‘shuttle traders’) becomes employees of bigger retail chains, 
- completion of the establishment of integrated business groups and ‘oli-
garchy’ on this platform (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Hoffman, 2002; 
Johnson, 1997; Perotti and Gelfer, 2003), 
- loans-for-shares auctions and capture of public institutions (semi-
bankirshchina, or the Seven Bankers’ Cabal) (Hellman, Jones and Kauf-
man, 2000). 
3. SME development in the 2000s  
A more detailed explanation of the specific of the next, fourth, period in the 
evolution of small entrepreneurship in Russia (1999-2008) is needed, because it 
has not yet been explored sufficiently in foreign literature. And – what is more 
important – (because) without such an observation, a shift in the State policy 
from ‘classical’ SME support scheme towards a more entrepreneurship ori-
ented approach would not be clear. 
In 1998, the crisis opened new opportunities for the development of ‘pro-
ductive entrepreneurship’, i.e., entrepreneurship based on the recognition and 
use of opportunities rather than on ways to secure rent income after the depar-
ture of bigger players from the market. This is particularly true for those small 
and medium-sized enterprises whose business relied on local resources and was 
covering demand by the middle class, gradually recovering and growing in 
numbers. Many of the current Russian gazelles formed and they started grow-
ing fast, which represent the second or third tier of Russian business – mostly 
in food processing, clothes and footwear manufacture, business services, IT, 
consulting, etc.: according to estimates, in the mid 2000s, the percentage of 
gazelles was not under 12-15% of the number of acting ventures – compared to 
4-8% in developed countries (see: Yudanov, 2008).  
After the departure of Boris Yeltsin and the refusal by the new president, 
Vladimir Putin, to endorse the unofficial commitment between the State and 
big business interests, there was a surge of “demand for the rule of law”, in-
cluding an independent judiciary system and efficient enforcement (Hendley, 
1999; Pistor, 1999; Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2005). The appearance 
of such demand was due, on the one hand, to the passing of the “wild 1990s”: 
fundamental changes took place in business practices and ethics, rendering 
them more civilized. On the other hand, the demand was driven by the post-
 305
privatisation institutional trap in corporate governance (combining an ex-
tremely low efficiency with high resistance against external influence) (Wood-
ruff, 2003), which could only be overcome by using the practices of asset raid-
ing. Corporate raiding in the early 2000s became the main threat for the 
management of post-privatised firms, enabled with the far from perfect law on 
bankruptcy (1998), which raiders actively used, so that inadequate owner-
managers found themselves motivated to have ownership rights codified and 
placed under the State’s protection as soon as possible. 
In the early 2000s new processes and trends forming in the evolution of en-
trepreneurship in Russia occurred. First, the increasing wages (+10-20% p.a.) 
pushed a fast growth of consumer demand, with organised retailing, services 
and public catering booming as a result, and in a new format, too – there was a 
multiplication of trade chains, which became the core customers of national 
manufacturers of basic goods. SME in bigger cities in retail trade, catering and 
services used this trend to become stronger.  
All in all, the dynamics of small business growth in Russia since the early 
2000s was on the whole positive. E.g., the number of incorporated small busi-
nesses increased in 1999-2008 from 900 to 1340 thousands, and the number of 
the employed from 6.2 to 11.4 mln. (Nabiullina, 2009).1 
Small business demonstrates growth rates above average economic figures. 
For example, the annual increase in the number of those employed in the sector 
is 8 times higher, and the investment activity is 3 times higher, than the na-
tional economic average. At that, one out of three companies in the country is a 
small firm, and one out of four employed is active in small business. In con-
struction, 97% of the companies are small businesses; small businesses produce 
nearly 70% of chilled fish; in the agricultural sector, they account for about 
60% of the gross output (Nabiullina, 2008). According to official SME statis-
tics for the period before the crisis, an upward trend in the small business de-
velopment was clearly articulated (see Table 1). Alternative data such as the 
early entrepreneurship index (TEA), as measured by Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) shows a little bit different tendency on the level of early entre-
preneurship. 
In 2008, the share of adult population, which expected to start a new busi-
ness in the next 3 years, was 5,27% (the lowest percentage among GEM coun-
tries). The level of Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity in 2008 was 3,49 %. 
The TEA Index has relatively increased by 30,7% in comparison with 2007. 
Nevertheless Russia’s TEA still remained one of the lowest among GEM-
countries. This position was composed of Russia’s 6th position by share of new 
                                                             
1  Note that in Russia up to the present moment statistics has been gathered on a regular base 
for incorporated small firms only; the number of sole traders, according to the first official 
census in 2007, ranged at 2.5 mln. 
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business owners (1,99%) and of the lowest level of nascent Entrepreneur’s 
Activity in GEM (1,73%). 
GEM adult population survey 2008 has shown that the level of Entrepreneu-
rial Activity for nascent entrepreneurs had relatively increased by 30% for year. 
The level of Entrepreneurial Activity for new businesses owners has increased 
more significantly (+48% of relative growth), in spite of the decrease of the 
economically active population in total decreased in Russia in 2008 comparing 
to 2007. The level of established business owners in Russia has decreased 
almost one third in 2008: from 1,68% to 1,11% – and has become the lowest 
among GEM-countries. The share of entrepreneurs who discontinued a busi-
ness was equal to 0,76% in 2008. Thus the turnover ratio (Nascent Entrepre-
neurs: Discontinued) was equal to 2,46 – there are 246 nascent entrepreneurs 
per 100 of people discontinued their business in 2008 (there have been 272 in 
2006 and 134 in 2007, respectively). 
The ratio of female entrepreneurship was near 48% – a bit higher than in the 
EU countries. The level of Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity for women 
was 2,6% (including 1% for new business owners) in 2008. This one for men is 
1,8 times as much (and 2 times for new firms). The share of opportunity based 
entrepreneurship has slightly decreased: in 2008 it was equal to 30% (among 
them at the stage of nascent entrepreneurship – near 24%, one of the lowest 
levels among GEM countries). The percentage of men and women perceiving 
their own knowledge, skill and experience for starting a new business as good 
made almost 18 % in average and has relatively decreased by more than 15% 
comparing to the previous year level (Monitoring i analiz…, p.6-7). 
The results of the 2008 wave of the GEM APS were rather twofold, showing 
both positive and negative dynamics of entrepreneurial activity in Russia. On 
the one hand, the level of the TEA has increased. On the other hand, both TEA 
and EBO (established business owners rate) were still the lowest in GEM.  
Table 1: Share of SME in main economic indicators (in per cent) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Average number of full time 
employees (without freelanc-
ers and external contractors) 
14,3 15,0 15,9 16,7 17,8 18,9 
Average number of freelancers 34,4 36,6 38,7 39,6 40,5 39,5 
Average number of external 
contractors 21,4 22,6 22,0 22,8 19,8 22,4 
GDP share 1) ... 9,8 12,5 12,0 11,6 ... 
Turnover ... ... ... 26,0 26,3 26,6 
Investment 2,9 2,4 3,5 3,3 3,6 3,9 
1) Share of small firms’ added value at GDP in market prices. 
Source: Maloe predprinimatelstvo v Rossii – 2008 (Small entrpreneurship in Russia in 2008). 
Moscow, Rosstat, 2009, Table 1.1. 
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It is obvious that, given the faster growth of wages in the non-market sector 
and the ever higher economic and administrative barriers (especially corruption 
of several inspections monitoring small firms), private enterprise was no longer 
an attractive alternative for would-be beginners. This fact can only be inter-
preted as evidence of the business development in Russia being unfavourable 
for start-ups. 
As for problems that are a significant factor in the development of small 
businesses already in place, these can be judged using the results of an 
OPORA-commissioned project implemented by VTsIOM in 2005 (the survey 
covered 80 of the RF’s 89 constituent territories, see: Otchot…). The report 
suggests that the financial situation of business, the level of costs of interfacing 
with authorities, the support for small businesses provided by the authorities 
were rated as acceptable by small business owners in the mid 2000s in most of 
Russia’s territories, which is not the case for the other 5 key factors – the con-
ditions and prospects for small business growth in the territory, the level of 
risks inherent in the interaction with inspecting authorities and the crime scene, 
the presence or absence of restrictions on market entry, the accessibility of 
commercial space, and legal (written law and efficiency of the enforcement) 
protection. 
4. Crisis and its impact on the perceived opportunities to 
start a new venture in Russia 
In summer of 2008 the period of a continuous economic prospect ended, since 
the mid of the autumn of 2008 the current economic crisis has broken out. The 
crisis came unexpected – despite several analytical papers published already in 
early 2007 showing that the macroeconomic situation (growing imports, big 
debts of private Russian companies, serving not the organic growth but rather 
the M&A activities of them, too expensive Ruble etc.) is changing to worse. 
Even the growing inflation in 2007-08 was not so much understood as a sign of 
an ‘overheated’ economy but simply as a result of unfavorable conjuncture of 
world food markets. 
The global financial crisis seriously affected the Russian economy. Begin-
ning from November 2008 to February 2009, a recession in Russia took place. 
In 2008, the GDP of Russia reduced by 8-11 %, according to different statisti-
cal issues. The reduction of the GDP in the 1st quarter of 2009 was ca. 7 %. 
The decrease of prices for oil and other raw materials (from the second part of 
2008 oil prices declined up to 70 %, on metals – up to 45 %) seriously affected 
Russian economy. Prices reduction urged the diminishing of Russian export by 
35 % from June to December 2008.  
Another crisis effect was the refusal to refinance the outer debts of Russian 
banks and corporations. Over the past 3 years the overall outer debt of Russian 
banks and corporations raised from 175 to nearly 500 bln. USD. 
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As a result, not only the demand on their goods and services, but also the 
access to external financial resources for small business became much more 
difficult. 
The statistics of small entrepreneurship for 2008 showed, however, no ‘dete-
rioration’ of macro-data – according to it (Nabiullina, 2009), number of SME 
on January, 1, 2009 was 1,367,000 (+ 20 % comparing with January, 1, 2008), 
average number of employees grew up to 11,419,000 pers. (+ 12 % comparing 
with January, 1, 2008), the share of SME at the GDP became 21 % (+ 4 % 
comparing with January, 1, 2008). Taking into account the slowdown of the 
second half of 2008, these results mark a very dynamic development of the 
sector in the first half of 2008, before the crisis. 
In spite of the crisis, the entrepreneurial activity of population grew, too, – 
as the comparison of the 2008 and 2009 GEM APS shows, the most indicators 
improved (Table 2).  
Table 2: Early entrepreneurial activity dynamic under the crisis 
№ Index 2008 2009 
1 ТЕА (share of early entrepreneurs among the adult population) 2,3% 3,7% 
2 Potential entrepreneurs (aiming to start-up) 2,7% 3,2% 
3 
ЕВО (share of established business owners among 
the adult population) 0,8% 1,6% 
4 
Share of opportunity based entrepreneurs among 
early entrepreneurs 39% 43% 
5 
Share of early entrepreneurial activity with high 
growth expectation (НЕА) 15,8% 15,5% 
6 Share of early entrepreneurial activity on new markets 21,1% 16,9% 
7 
Turnover coefficient of early entrepreneurship 
(start-ups : discontinued in last 12 months) 1,35 2,33 
Source: Rannee predprinimatelstvo v Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo crisisa.  
Table 3: Compared to one year ago, starting your business now is…, (% of 18-
64 aged population 
 Nascent entre-
preneur 
Baby business 
owner-manager 
established entre-
preneur 
More difficult 30,9 37,9 58,6 
Somewhat more difficult 29,0 27,1 19,8 
About the same 23,1 32,0 17,2 
Somewhat less difficult 7,1 - - 
Less difficult 3,0 3,0 - 
Don’t Know 3,7 - 4,4 
Refused 3,2 - - 
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Rannee predprinimatelstvo v Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo crisisa. 
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In 2009, the Moscow GEM team included into the questionnaire some addi-
tional questions to prove the impact of crisis on entrepreneurial activity. The 
survey results (Table 3) confirm that by the spring of 2009 there was a consid-
erable deterioration in conditions for starting a business. Most representatives 
of all entrepreneurial groups – from nascent entrepreneurs to owners of estab-
lished businesses – think that it became more difficult or even much more 
difficult to launch a new business as compared with 2008. The older a business 
the more critical are entrepreneurs’ assessments. For instance, if a business is 
over 3.5 years old, 78% respondents indicate a deterioration in conditions for 
starting a business. Among the owners of new businesses (from 3 months to 3.5 
years), a deterioration was pointed out by 65%, while among nascent entrepre-
neurs (with businesses of under 3 months) a deterioration was noted by 60% of 
the respondents. The evaluation made by the owners of new businesses appear 
to be the most reliable, as their personal experience of entrepreneurial start-up 
was gained during 2006-2008, which period is similar for entrepreneurial envi-
ronment parameters. 
Opportunity for organising a new business is one more entrepreneurial envi-
ronment factor that reflects mostly the market environment and the presence or 
absence of vacant market niches and their capacity. Most entrepreneurs share 
the opinion that the crisis has limited opportunities for starting a new business 
(Table 4). The older the businesses the more pessimistic are their owners: at 
least 80% of the negative evaluations for established entrepreneurs, at most 
76% for new ones, and 47% for nascent entrepreneurs. 
Table 4: What impact has the global economic slowdown had on the business 
opportunities for this start-up (% of 18-64 aged population) 
 Nascent 
entrepreneur 
Baby business 
owner-manager 
established 
entrepreneur 
More business opportunities  6,3 3,9 - 
Somewhat more business 
opportunities  6,8 - - 
No impact  33,2 16,3 18,9 
Somewhat fewer business 
opportunities  16,9 39,7 35,4 
Fewer business opportunities  29,8 36,1 45,7 
Don’t Know 7,1 4,0 - 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Rannee predprinimatelstvo v Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo crisisa. 
 
The crisis has changed, overwhelmingly for the worse, not only the oppor-
tunities for starting new businesses, but also the prospects for existing busi-
nesses (Table 5). The expectations for business growth have weakened, includ-
ing insignificantly so in respondents comprising about 1/3 of the group of 
nascent entrepreneurs, 2/3 of new ones, and ¾ of established entrepreneurs. 
 310
With environmental deterioration, business age oftentimes plays a role of a 
development limiter, probably due to the fact that over time businesses lost 
mobility, which is required for adapting a business to external changes.  
Table 5: Compared to one year ago, your expectations for growth are now… 
(% of 18-64 aged population) 
 Nascent entrepre-
neur 
Baby business 
owner-manager 
established entre-
preneur 
Lower 9,4 32,8 38,1 
Somewhat lower 20,0 25,4 37,7 
About the same 40,8 34,1 20,1 
Somewhat higher 3,5 3,7 - 
Higher 6,2 - - 
Does not apply 12,7 - 4,0 
Don’t Know 7,5 4,0 - 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Rannee predprinimatelstvo v Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo crisisa. 
Table 6: Which of the following sentences best describes the impact of the 
global crisis on your willingness to start-up? (% of 18-64 aged population) 
 Nascent 
entrepreneur 
Baby busi-
ness owner-
manager 
Established 
entrepreneur 
Non-
entrepreneur 
have to think about 
starting a business 19,6 11,7 3,8 1,9 
I’d like to start busi-
ness more strength 23,2 8,9 11,9 1,6 
Refused to start 
business - - - 2,4 
The crisis didn’t influ-
ence to start business  10,8 3,5 6,9 4,5 
Neither before nor 
now, I do not intend to 
start businesses 
- - - 74,6 
intend to continue 
businesses irrespective 
of the crisis 
26,0 55,7 48,4 2,4 
intend to close / 
suspend a business 3,1 8,8 14,4 0,9 
Don’t know 17,3 5,2 14,6 3,3 
Refused - 6,3 - 8,3 
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Rannee predprinimatelstvo v Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo crisisa. 
 
As it is clearly shown (Arenius and Minniti, 2005), entrepreneurial envi-
ronment is far from being the only factor for determining whether or not one 
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should conduct one’s own business but much dependent from perceived indi-
vidual’s knowledge, experience, and participation in relevant network commu-
nities. Is crisis an additional significant characteristic of the entrepreneurial 
environment, influencing the entrepreneurial potential of adult population? 
This is confirmed by the answers given by the participants of the 2009 survey 
(Table 6). 
About half of the owners of new and established businesses mentioned that 
they intend to continue with their businesses irrespective of the crisis. Amid the 
crisis, about 20% of new entrepreneurs had intentions to start a business (‘first 
business’ or a version of strategy for diversifying an existing business), while 
9% intended to close/suspend a business (obviously not the only one). Estab-
lished business owners noted that the crisis equally (in about 15%) impelled to 
both start-up a new venture and close the existing ones. 
On the whole, most (about 50%) of those who by the spring of 2009 had 
businesses of satisfactory standing intended to continue with it regardless of the 
recessionary environment. Intentions to start a new business, if such intentions 
arose (in every 4th owners of a new business and ensure every 5th owner of an 
established business) were largely provoked by the crisis. An involuntary ‘cri-
sis-caused’ closure/suspension of a business – one of several businesses owned 
by an entrepreneur – occurred with every 7th-11th owner of established and 
new businesses respectively. In other words, the crisis has served as an accel-
erator mostly for creating new entrepreneurial entities rather than clos-
ing/suspending existing ones. 
Nascent entrepreneurs for the most part (43%) received an impetus toward 
opening businesses exactly due to the crisis. Those whose intentions to launch 
businesses did not depend on the crisis accounted for only 11%, while those 
who closed/suspended their businesses due to the crisis accounted for as low as 
3% of this group. The crisis became the main reason why entrepreneurs who 
had very short-term experience took up business activities.  
All in all, however, the perceived situation seemed to be more dramatic than 
the macro-data both of the SME statistics as well as of the real entrepreneurial 
activity dynamic shown by the same GEM APS results. Supported by a clear, 
transparent and sustainable State policy, the entrepreneurship development 
could be significantly enhanced. However, the policy of the Russian State 
under these circumstances remained to be rather inconsistent. 
5. SME Support and Entrepreneurship Promotion under the 
Crisis  
A clear distinction between entrepreneurship policy and SME policy (Storey, 
2003) has never been made by responsible state authorities in Russia, even 
among experts it is still a lack of understanding of two different approaches, 
which could be summarized as follows: ‘While SME policy has a focus on the 
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existing stock of SMEs, entrepreneurship policy is more encompassing in that 
it includes potential entrepreneurs as well as the existing stock of SMEs. This 
suggests that entrepreneurship policy is more focused on the process of change, 
regardless of the organizational unit, whereas SME policy is focused exclu-
sively on the enterprise level. Entrepreneurship policy also has a greater sensi-
tivity to framework or environmental conditions that shape the decision-
making process of entrepreneurs... However, it is important to emphasize that 
SME policy still remains at the core of entrepreneurship policy.’ (Audretsch, 
2002, p.47-48). 
In sum, the government policies towards SME and entrepreneurship in Rus-
sia have passed through a number of periods: 
- in the early 1990s the government followed the concept of the macroeco-
nomic policy to establish main institutions inevitable for a market-driven 
economy as more important than SME focused policies – in this context, the 
policy of financial stabilisation and privatisation aimed at supporting pre-
conditions for any kind of private entrepreneurship in general rather than 
targeting some specific groups of entrepreneurs and firms (like start-ups and 
high growing SMEs), 
- from the mid 1990s preference was given to the concept of supporting small 
firms by measures of a ‘traditional’ SME policy (which are efficient under 
conditions of a balanced macro-, mezzo- and microeconomic policy in es-
tablished market economies with transparent system of efficient state regu-
lating authorities), but in absence of any well functioning and recognised in-
stitutions especially at the bottom level and being steadily underfinanced, it 
has not had any impact on the state of things in the small business sector it-
self, 
- during the crisis of 1998, this system of state support for small business 
began by and large to collapse, and circles close to the government become 
ever more convinced not only of its inefficiency, ‘radicals’ complained even 
about the total irrelevance of the small business support concept; finally the 
pendulum swings back to the idea of rather entrepreneurship than SME pol-
icy, 
- by the mid 2000s, there re-emerges the realisation of the need to implement, 
along with improving general conditions for business development, a better 
targeted entrepreneurship policy, to provide specific assistance to some key 
groups of SMEs, 
- with the crisis in progress, starting in late 2008 a large-scale support for 
start-up groups is again all but abandoned in favour of fast-response meas-
ures. 
One should include in the category of recurring the mistakes in the devel-
opment and implementation of government policies towards SME and entre-
preneurship, first of all, limited involvement of civil society stakeholders in the 
process of policy development and implementation; absence of comprehensive 
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analysis of policy background, progress and results; failure to grasp not only 
the common features, but also the differences between policies to support small 
businesses (i.e., firms) and those to boost the entrepreneurial potential of the 
society (i.e., of persons), the latter being obviously underrated; finally, absence 
of policy coordination at the federal and territorial levels. 
As soon as the spring of 2008, however, without any public discussion of 
achievements and failures of the preceding programme, new priorities were 
formulated by the Ministry for Economic Development (MED) in the area of 
SME policy for the period up to 2020, with an interim stage identified, 2009-
2011 (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Main characteristic of the federal financial programme for the support 
of SME 
Action Targets for 2009-2011 
Federal budget 
allocations, bln 
roubles 
Targets for 
2020 
Territorial and municipal 
business incubators 120 beneficiaries 4.8 500 beneficiaries 
Territorial venture funds 30 funds 10.0 30 funds 
Territorial direct investment 
funds 30 funds 4.8 85 funds 
Startup grants  100,000 grants 10.8 250,000 grants (annually) 
Territorial surety funds 85 funds 5.0 85 funds 
Support under municipal 
programmes for small 
business promotion 
50 programmes 1.8 300 programmes 
Industrial estates, science 
parks 40 beneficiaries 6.3 100 beneficiaries 
Reimbursement for the 
expense of integration into 
power grids in target areas 
Up to 100 kW 3.25* - 
Support for export-oriented 
companies 1,500 companies 3.25 5,500 companies 
Total federal budget alloations  50.0  
Of which:  
- 2009-2011 federal 
budget allocations 
- additional funding  
* action in effect until 2011  
  
 
13.5 
 
36.5 
 
Source: Nabiullina (2008). 
 
But the economic crisis since early autumn 2008 put on hold the implemen-
tation of long-term plans. In late December 2008, support of SME was put on 
the “List of Priority Measures of the Government of the Russian Federation” as 
part of its action against the effects of the global financial crisis. In April 2009 
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a comprehensive and complex State anti-crisis program of the Government has 
been adopted, where a list of measures addressed to support the SME and en-
trepreneurial policy has been included. The measures adopted by the Govern-
ment are as follows: 
- the lending programme of the State’s main agent in the area of financial 
support for SMEs, Vneshekonombank, will be increased to RUR 60 bln., 
- RUR10.5 bln. will be provided from the federal treasury to fund the forma-
tion of small business start-ups (this involves measures such as lending, in-
terest rate subsidies, provision of government guarantees, development of 
infrastructure such as science parks and business incubators, allocation of 
grants and implementation of training programmes), 
- a law to provide for preferential treatment of small businesses when State 
and municipal procurement – the minimum quote of SME’s goods and ser-
vices in public purchases is 20 %. This measure provides SMEs with extra 
20 bln. EUR public purchases, 
- a resolution has been passed to lower the charge for power grid connection 
of low-consumption facilities (5.5 minimum wage amount for facilities up to 
15 kW),  
- the federal government introduced special real estate funds for SMEs. These 
funds provide SME’s with discount and long-term rental rates, 
- territories and municipalities are obliged to involve SMEs in the fulfilment 
of government and municipal orders, remove administration barriers to en-
trepreneurial activities, including restrictions on access to local markets, 
- measures have been implemented to reduce the tax burden on SME. Russian 
regional governments are in their own right to reduce the so-called single 
tax on imputed income from 15 % to 5 %, 
- deregulation measures are included to minimize the administrative burdens 
especially for start-ups in order to diminish the entry financing. So, starting 
from July 2009 the registration of a small business has become simplified. 
An entrepreneur only has to inform the government that he or she is staring 
a new business without getting all sorts of permissions. Administrative in-
spections of SME’s activity in Russia are restricted at once in 3 years. Ex-
traordinary inspections of SMEs are to be permitted by a State prosecutor. 
The main principles of the anti-crisis policy of Russian government are the 
following: 
- cost sharing with regional administrations: funds from the federal budget are 
provided for regional governments – in a proportion of 1 to 4. This means 
that for 1 EUR from the regional budget 4 EUR from the federal budget are 
subsidised. Moreover, up to 60 % of the funding can be accessed by regional 
administrations in advance. 
- priority co-funding is provided to regions that mostly influenced the effects 
of the global financial crisis (whilst it is an arbitrary decision to decide, who 
is affected more strongly by the crisis). 
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- funding is made available and supervised by the special development insti-
tution of the Russian State, the “Vnesheconombank”. 
How efficient are the measures proposed? As for facilitating access to credit 
facilities, the problem is not so much amounts as credit terms and guarantees, 
on which federal budget allocations have little direct effect, if any.  
It will naturally benefit SMEs if their power grid connection charge is low-
ered and they are granted the right of first refusal to buy the State and munici-
pal assets which they have been renting for years and which have already been 
significantly improved.  
Measures to reduce tax burden – by way of lowering the profit tax – can be 
important for the few sustainable growing companies, which are still in the 
black despite the crisis in progress. However, the share of such successful SME 
diminished very significantly, whilst the main goal of an anti-crisis protection 
should be to support those SMEs who are suffering from finance shortage.  
As for the right granted to territories to lower at their discretion the rate of 
single tax on imputed income from 15 to 5 % of gross income, this measure can 
be regarded in the context of the territories’ rising budget deficit as passing the 
buck to them rather than a real step in bringing relief to small businesses.  
Having been portrayed by and large as priorities, the measures can hardly 
make a significant impact because they have too little focus on target groups 
which should be promoted especially under the terms of crisis – start-ups and 
innovative SMEs. For instance, the accumulation of up to 12 unemployment 
allowance amounts makes les than 2000 EUR, which is not enough to finance 
any serious activities of nascent entrepreneurs. The formation of new business-
parks and business-incubators will hardly be very supportive for innovative 
start-ups because it is not embedded in any serious program of long term fi-
nance support of them, and the State development institutions like Russian 
Venture Company, Rosnano Corporation etc. are not inclined to promote  
6. Conclusions 
In Russia, SME became a significant factor of economic life and social prac-
tice – even in spite of several obstacles of rather systemic character and incon-
sistent State policy. However, the entrepreneurial spirit among adults was not 
so much strong in the 2000s – first, because well educated and motivated peo-
ple have had enough chances as employees (white collars” etc in economy, 
bureaucrats in the State sector) without taking risks of establishing a new ven-
ture, second, because of several informal constrains (high entry barriers of both 
economic and administrative character etc.). 
Basing on the description of SME sector development and its features, as 
well as of the small business and entrepreneurship policy in Russia in late 
1990s – the first decade of 2000s, we can argue that shortcuts of the State pol-
icy towards SME and entrepreneurship were unavoidable. First, lack of ade-
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quate institutions (among them, experience in developing and realizing ade-
quate policy), second, strategic failure in setting-up of priorities lead to confus-
ing results. Rather an entrepreneurship policy was in need under systemic tran-
sition: promoting environment for new ventures, it could help to establish a 
broader stratum of ‘productive small entrepreneurship’ in Russia. Instead, the 
government tried to establish SME policy in a form similar to that in developed 
market economies in late 1950-1970.  
As a result, other – rent seeking oriented – forms of entrepreneurship (‘un-
productive’ or even ‘destructive’, using William Baumol’s terms – Baumol, 
1990) became dominant. Under such circumstances, the ‘old fashioned’ SME 
policy was obsolete – it could merely promote conservation of the established 
structure (micro business with little added value creation, predominantly in 
retail trade etc.), but not shape conditions for high growth new ventures.  
A new agenda in early – mid 2000s was combining traditional SME and 
some important entrepreneurship policy measures, but realized in the old bu-
reaucratic manner (no transparency, no feed back from the SME sector, no 
monitoring according to clearly defined criteria) it didn’t lead to a break 
through. And in 2008, after the finish of the last SME promotion program, the 
crisis occurred which should enforce rather reactive than pro-active approach in 
policy designing and implementing.  
In Russia, the strategic objective of government policies must be to support 
productive entrepreneurship and limit the options for rent-oriented or even 
parasitic growth of the two other types. But this task: (a) must be recognized, 
(b) involves sweeping, fundamental changes in the system of ownership rights 
and the entire structure of social relations, for the domination of unproductive 
and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurship is inseparable from the system of ‘power-
ownership’ (Nureev, R., Runov A., 2003), – a specific socio-economic model 
very similar to that of the Marxian ‘Asiatic mode of production’ (Lubasz, H., 
1990), which disguises itself as the system of private ownership and resists 
eradication.  
While mostly entrenched in the segment of the so-called super large and 
large business, unproductive and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurship is actually 
rooted in the close personal ties with the ruling political elite. An alternative is 
‘productive entrepreneurship’, which is mostly based on the segment of SME. 
It is forced to put up with the government’s veiled attempts to gain control and 
is not free from opportunistic behaviour patterns, but the sources of its income 
are still based on a different area – in the area of realignment of market re-
sources for the production of new benefits. 
Therefore, traditional SME policies providing support for any kind of pri-
vate enterprise (tax exemptions, state procurement and subcontracting promo-
tion etc.) in such an environment do not undermine the positions of unproduc-
tive and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurship. On the other hand, entrepreneurship 
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policy, focused on providing advice and help for start-ups of ‘productive entre-
preneurship’ can foster the consolidation of the latter. 
Thus, SME policies in Russia have never been consistent, penetrating or 
comprehensive in their nature – that would contradict to the interests of princi-
pal beneficiaries of abortive reforms in Russia. Hence, to outline and conduct a 
balanced entrepreneurship policy, a sufficiently strong coalition to support such 
policies is needed. 
The groundwork for such a coalition to be put together can be laid within 
the framework of the following alignment: ‘productive entrepreneurship’ – new 
professionals (since the value of knowledge will inevitably depreciate if domi-
nated by unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship) – new regional leaders 
(because they have no potential allies or sources, other than the SME, for fuel-
ling the social and economic development of the territories under their jurisdic-
tion), with tacit consent of the nation’s leadership (because the ambitious goals 
set by it for the innovation-oriented economy under development cannot be 
achieved as long as Russia is dominated by the currently prevalent types of 
entrepreneurship). 
The crisis in 2008 once more changed the entrepreneurial framework condi-
tions. Most entrepreneurs shared the opinion that the crisis has limited opportu-
nities for starting a new business.  
Nevertheless, about 50% of those who by the spring of 2009 had businesses 
for more than 3 months intended to continue with it regardless of the recession-
ary environment, while the intentions to start a new business, if such intentions 
arose, were largely provoked by the crisis. The crisis has served as an accelera-
tor mostly for creating new entrepreneurial entities rather than clos-
ing/suspending existing ones. 
The crisis which began in late 2008 will have a long-term impact on entre-
preneurship development. The insufficiency and lack of contingency of the 
federal government SME and entrepreneurship policy may enforce those inter-
est groups which are favouring a public supported policy to promote productive 
entrepreneurship (Yakovlev, 2006), to organize a serious public pressure on the 
federal and regional bureaucracy in order of developing a sound agenda of such 
policy. 
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